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Abstract 
Objective: Although research often relies on retrospective affect self-reports, little is 
known about personality’s role in retrospective reports and how these converge or deviate from 
affect reported in the moment. This micro-longitudinal study examines personality (neuroticism, 
extraversion) and emotional salience (peak, recent affect) associations with retrospective-
momentary affect report discrepancies over different timeframes. Method: 179 adults aged 20-
78 (M = 48.7 years; 73.7% Caucasian/White) each provided up to 60 concurrent affect reports 
over 10 days, then retrospectively reported overall intensity of each affective state after one day 
and again after 1-2 months. Results: Multilevel models revealed that individuals retrospectively 
overreported or underreported various affective states, exhibiting peak associations for high 
arousal positive and negative affect, recency associations for low arousal positive affect, and 
distinct personality profiles that strengthened over time. Individuals high in both extraversion 
and neuroticism exaggerated high arousal positive/negative affect and underreported low arousal 
positive affect, high extraversion/low neuroticism individuals exaggerated high arousal positive 
affect and underreported low arousal positive affect, and low extraversion/high neuroticism 
individuals exaggerated high and low arousal negative affect. Conclusions: This study is the first 
to identify arousal-specific retrospective affect report discrepancies over time and suggests 
retrospective reports also reflect personality differences in affective self-knowledge.  
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Neuroticism and Extraversion Magnify Discrepancies between Retrospective and Concurrent 
Affect Reports 
Recalling affective experiences is integral to daily life – affect recall guides goal-directed 
behaviour, decision-making, and planning, and is also a primary source of information in much 
psychological research (Fredrickson, 2000; Levine, Lench, & Safer, 2009; Robinson & Clore, 
2002). For instance, high arousal negative affective states like anxiety provide a crucial impetus 
to get out of harm’s way, and their recall helps ensure the situation that elicited them (such as 
stepping in front of an oncoming truck) is avoided. Retrospective reports of past affect may in 
fact be more important than momentary reports of current affect in predicting future behavior, 
even if they are inaccurate (Schwarz, 2007; Wirtz, Kruger, Scollon, & Diener, 2003). Yet, little 
is known about how affect recall may be tied to the salience of past affective experiences and, 
importantly, to individual differences in general affective tendencies. Using up to 60 concurrent 
affect reports over a ten day period and retrospective reports obtained at two time points (1 day 
afterwards and 1-2 months afterwards) from adults aged 20-78 years, this study investigates how 
emotional salience (peak and recent affect) and personality (neuroticism and extraversion) may 
be linked with discrepancies between retrospective and concurrent affect reports.  
Previous research comparing retrospective to concurrent affect reports indicates people 
tend to exaggerate the intensity of past affective experiences when retrospectively reporting how 
they felt over a given period (Hedges, Jandorf, & Stone, 1985; Kardum & Daskijević, 2001; 
Parkinson, Briner, Reynolds, & Totterdell, 1995; Thomas & Diener, 1990; Wirtz et al., 2003). 
This occurs for both positive affect (e.g. happy, calm) and negative affect (e.g. anxious, sad), 
with commonly-used retrospective affect measures (e.g. Diener & Emmons, 1984; Watson & 
Tellegen, 1985). Why this discrepancy? Because it is impossible to re-live felt affect, people 
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recreate it in an approximate way by mentally reconstructing the times when they felt a certain 
way, using personally meaningful information (Fredrickson, 2000; Robinson & Clore, 2002). 
Emotional Salience and Retrospective-Momentary Affect Report Discrepancies 
When recalling overall affective experience over the past few hours or days, retrospective 
affect intensity ratings tend to be biased toward emotionally salient experiences, specifically, 
peak affect and recent affect (Hedges et al., 1985; Kahneman, 2000; Robinson & Clore, 2002; 
Parkinson et al., 1995). Consider Greg, who has had a tumultuous week due to layoffs at work, 
but who found out at week’s end that his job was safe. When asked to report the overall intensity 
of negative and positive affect he felt over this past week, Greg might bring to mind experiences 
of intense worry (peak affect) and of relief at week’s end (recent affect), leading him to 
retrospectively exaggerate both the negative and the positive affect he felt. Peak and recent affect 
are emotionally salient because they carry self-relevant information about intense emotions to be 
coped with (peak affect: Greg fearing for his job) and about final outcomes (recent affect: Greg 
learning his job was safe; Fredrickson, 2000). Because of their instrumental role in planning, 
peak and recent affect are important for survival and health (Schwarz, 2007), and hence, their 
retrospective exaggeration may in fact be adaptive (Levine et al., 2009). The current study 
examines whether emotional salience (peak and recency associations) magnify retrospective 
affect intensity ratings such that they deviate from affect reports provided in the moment. 
Personality and Retrospective-Momentary Affect Report Discrepancies 
Time is also important in affect recall. The further one moves away from lived 
experience, the more one can expect to see systematic divergences between retrospective and 
concurrent affect reports. As affective experiences fade over time, people rely increasingly on 
more stable self-knowledge and heuristics to fill in the gaps when giving retrospective reports 
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(Robinson & Clore, 2002). For example, people who see themselves as generally anxious may 
inadvertently put more emphasis on anxiety when reporting past affect, as compared to those for 
whom anxiety is less a part of their self-schema. Beliefs about one’s affective tendencies may 
serve to maintain a coherent self-image (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and have been shown 
to influence trait and retrospective affect reports but not concurrent reports (Robinson & Clore, 
2002). Hence, in addition to emotional salience associations, general beliefs about one’s affect 
may be linked to discrepancies between retrospective and concurrent affect reports, and the role 
of these beliefs may grow when one moves further in time from the lived affective experiences.  
 To examine links between affect recall and general beliefs about one’s own affective 
tendencies, the present study targets two of the Big Five traits, neuroticism and extraversion 
(Costa & McCrae, 1989), as these are the personality traits that have been shown to map onto the 
basic dimensions of negative and positive affectivity (Watson & Clark, 1992). Central to 
neuroticism (N) is proneness to anxiety, worry, and other negative emotions (Costa & McCrae, 
1989; Watson & Clark, 1992). Hence, if Greg self-identifies with attributes typical of N, he may 
recall more intense negative affect when thinking back to how he felt during layoffs. N has 
indeed been linked to retrospective exaggeration of negative affect (Barret, 1997; Mill, Realo, & 
Allik, 2016; Safer & Keuler, 2002). In contrast, extraversion (E), the tendency to feel energetic 
and sociable (Costa & McCrae, 1989; Watson & Clark, 1992), has been linked to retrospective 
exaggeration of positive affect (Barrett, 1997; Mill et al., 2016). The question of how affect 
retrospection may be tied to personality has concerned researchers for decades (Costa & McCrae, 
1980; Watson & Clark, 1992). However, to our knowledge, only three studies have examined 
personality associations with discrepancies between retrospective and concurrent affect reports 
(Barrett, 1997; Mill et al., 2016; Safer & Keuler, 2002), two of which were limited to university 
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samples. Hence, the present study focuses on N and E as key personality factors in a lifespan 
community sample: it is expected that individuals high in N will exaggerate their negative affect, 
while individuals high in E will exaggerate their positive affect, in retrospective affect reports. 
Affect Arousal Level and Retrospective-Momentary Affect Report Discrepancies 
 Previous research on retrospective affect discrepancies differentiates between positive 
and negative affect valence (e.g. PANAS; Watson & Tellegen, 1985); however, this has left out 
much variety in affective experience, such as being excited vs. calm. Multidimensional scaling 
has identified an arousal dimension that captures this variety; high arousal means feeling tense or 
energetic and low arousal means fatigue or stillness (Russell, 1980). Hence, the present study 
uses a two-dimensional affective space comprising four affect categories: high arousal positive 
affect, low arousal positive affect, high arousal negative affect, and low arousal negative affect. 
 The proposed emotional salience and personality links with retrospective affect report 
discrepancies may depend on the distinction between high and low arousal affect. Emotionally 
arousing events are stored more effectively in memory (Kensinger, 2004), which may reflect an 
evolutionarily-derived priority for remembering high arousal affect in response to threats or other 
important events. Hence, peak and recency associations with retrospective reports may be 
stronger for high arousal affect than for low arousal affect. Previous emotional salience findings 
(Hedges et al., 1985; Kahneman, 2000; Parkinson et al., 1995) have not distinguished between 
high and low arousal affect, leaving open the possibility that high arousal items in these studies’ 
affect measures may be driving the associations or be playing a larger role than low arousal 
items. Likewise, the proposed personality links with retrospective reports may apply more to 
high arousal, rather than low arousal, affect. Although neuroticism (N) is associated with general 
negative affectivity, high arousal negative affect (e.g. anxiety) is more central to N than low 
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arousal affect (e.g. sadness), reflecting the high stress reactivity characteristic of N (Costa & 
McCrae, 1989; John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991). Hence, high arousal negative affect may figure 
more prominently in how people high in N see themselves. Extraversion (E) is also tied to high 
arousal affect, but of a positive variety: standard measures of E assess energy and enthusiasm 
(Costa & McCrae, 1989; John et al., 1991). Hence, high arousal positive affect (e.g. excitement) 
may be more central to a person high in E than low arousal affect (e.g. calm). Previous research 
investigating personality associations with retrospective-momentary affect report discrepancies 
either examined positive and negative affect categories (Barrett, 1997; Safer & Keuler, 2002) or 
specific emotion items (Mill et al., 2016), but none has explicitly distinguished between high and 
low arousal affect. However, the way N and E are conceptualized suggests associations may be 
specific to high arousal affect – a possibility the current study seeks to investigate. 
Time and Retrospective-Momentary Affect Report Discrepancies 
Although emotional salience associations with retrospective reports are likely to fade 
over time as lived experiences fade (Robinson & Clore, 2002), the time course of personality 
associations is less clear. Most previous work on emotional salience and personality associations 
captured only one retrospective report per participant (Barrett, 1997; Hedges et al., 1985; 
Kahneman, 2000; Parkinson et al., 1995; Safer & Keuler, 2002) and hence could not address 
change over time, with the exception of one study that involved repeated daily life assessments 
over a relatively short period of 14 days (Mill et al., 2016). The current study expands on 
previous work by investigating how emotional salience (peak and recency) and personality (N 
and E) might be tied to discrepancies between retrospective and concurrent affect reports, and 
how these associations might change as the period over which people recall their affect lengthens 
from several days to several weeks. It is expected that for timeframes of several days (when 
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experiences are fresh), emotional salience associations will be relatively strong, but that they will 
be diminished for a recall period of several weeks or longer. Personality associations, in contrast, 
are expected to be stronger for the longer recall period as compared to the shorter period because 
as time passes, individuals may come to draw more on general self-knowledge to compensate for 
fading memory of specific affective experiences (Robinson & Clore, 2002). 
The specific aim of the present study was to examine how personality (neuroticism and 
extraversion) and emotional salience (peak and recent affect) might be tied to retrospective-
momentary affect report discrepancies over different timeframes. 179 adults aged 20-78 years 
each provided up to six concurrent affect reports each day for a 10-day period using handheld 
devices, and provided retrospective reports of overall affect intensity approximately one day later 
and again approximately 1-2 months later. Retrospective affect discrepancies indicate the extent 
to which participants’ ratings of overall felt affect deviate from their averaged in-the-moment 
affect reports. Hypotheses are as follows: (1) Peak momentary affect will be associated with 
retrospective overreporting of high arousal positive and negative affect and the strength of these 
associations will be greater for reports given after one day compared to reports given after 1-2 
months; (2) Recent momentary affect will also be associated with retrospective overreporting of 
high arousal positive and negative affect, and more so at the earlier retrospective reporting time; 
(3) Neuroticism will be associated with retrospective exaggeration of high arousal negative 
affect, and the strength of this association will be greater for reports given after 1-2 months 
compared to those given after one day; and (4) Extraversion will be associated with retrospective 
exaggeration of high arousal positive affect, and more so at the later retrospective report time. 
No emotional salience or personality associations are expected for low arousal affect reports.  
This study also controls for age, gender, ethnicity, education, and cognitive abilities in 
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the retrospective-momentary affect report discrepancy models. These control variables were 
selected based on previous research demonstrating that older adults selectively recall more 
positive and less negative affective experiences (Grühn, Scheibe, & Baltes, 2007; Mather & 
Carstensen, 2005; Ready, Weinberger, & Jones, 2007); that gender-based self-schemas can shape 
reported emotional intensity (Robinson, Johnson, & Shields, 1998); that there are cultural 
differences in the value placed on different kinds of affect (Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006); and 
that education, verbal knowledge, and inductive reasoning may all help individuals accurately 
distinguish and report on their affect (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Derman, 1976). 
Method 
Participants 
 The sample was 179 adults (M age = 48.7 years, SD = 18.9; 37.4% aged 20-39, 28.5% 
aged 40-59; 34.1% aged 60-78) living in Atlanta and the surrounding area. Recruitment was 
done through an existing participant database, participant referral, and postcards sent to potential 
participant contacts purchased from an ad agency. The sample was stratified by age and 
employment status to encompass a range of socioeconomic backgrounds, with university student 
participation limited to 26% for the young adult group. The final sample was 50.8% female, 
73.7% Caucasian/White, 19.6% African-American/Black, 2.2% Asian, and well educated (86.0% 
with at least some college/university education). An additional 10 participants were excluded due 
to personal circumstances (death in family, recent surgery, shift work, frequent work absence), 
psychotropic medication use, mental illness (panic/anxiety attacks, PTSD, mood disorders), 
misunderstanding of procedures, or substantial missing data. A further 11 participants were 
excluded due to missing data on key personality measures. Participants who completed the study 
were compensated USD 100, and those who completed only certain portions were compensated 
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USD 10 to USD 30 depending on extent of completion. The study was approved by the Georgia 
Institute of Technology Research Ethics Board. For more information on sample and procedures, 
see Scott, Sliwinski, and Blanchard-Fields (2013).  
Procedure 
 Participants completed a mail-out package containing personality and other individual 
difference measures, and then an in-lab session, which included cognitive testing and training on 
the use of the handheld devices for the study. Next, for a 10-day period, participants completed 
six daily questionnaires assessing current affect and other behavioural and hormonal measures 
not used in the present analyses. Each day, participants completed the first questionnaire upon 
awakening and were then beeped at regular intervals to complete five additional questionnaires 
using a handheld device (Tungsten T). After the time-sampling phase, participants provided 
study feedback and returned their handheld devices. Participants generally reported that their 
days in study were typical of their everyday lives (M = 4.2 on a 5-point scale). In the exit session, 
participants were asked to recall how they had felt since the beginning of the study (including the 
time-sampling period); the same affect items used in the time-sampling phase were re-
administered to obtain these exit retrospective affect reports. One month later, participants were 
mailed a follow-up questionnaire package containing individual difference measures and were 
asked once again (using the same set of affect items) how they had felt since the beginning of the 
study, which included the time-sampling period and the intervening time between the time-
sampling phase and the follow-up report. Participants mailed their completed questionnaires 
back to the lab; of the 179 participants, 143 (80%) completed the follow-up package, and the 
remaining 36 participants completed the exit session only. Participants who completed the 
follow-up differed from those who did not do the follow-up in that they were older (M = 51.1 vs. 
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39.4 years of age, p < .001) and more likely to identify as Caucasian/White (78.3% vs. 55.6% 
Caucasian, p < 0.01). Hence, age and ethnicity are included as covariates in analyses. All 179 
participants who provided at least one retrospective affect report are included in analyses. One 
participant’s exit session reports were excluded due to a suspected recording error (the exit 
session date was recorded as being before the end of the participant’s time-sampling period). 
Measures 
 Momentary Affect Ratings. At each assessment, participants indicated the extent to 
which they were currently experiencing each of eight affective states on a 5-point scale (1 = “not 
at all”, 5 = “very much”). Items captured affective states of high and low arousal and of positive 
and negative valence, and were selected based on previous work demonstrating their usefulness 
in cross-cultural lifespan samples (Magai, Consedine, Krivoshekova, Kudadjie-Gyamfi, & 
McPherson, 2006; Tsai et al., 2006). Items represent each of four combinations of arousal and 
valence: high arousal positive affect (happy, excited; item intercorrelation r = 0.43, p < .01), low 
arousal positive affect (quiet, calm; r = 0.36, p < .01), high arousal negative affect (nervous, 
irritated; r = 0.43, p < .01), low arousal negative affect (sad, sleepy; r = .18, p < .01). Four affect 
scales were created by averaging the two items in each category. Scale means were: high arousal 
positive affect (M = 3.07, SD = 0.60), low arousal positive affect (M = 3.64, SD = 0.52), high 
arousal negative affect (M = 1.61, SD = 0.52), low arousal negative affect (M = 1.85, SD = 0.48).  
Participants each provided up to 60 affect reports over 10-day period, for a total of 9973 
momentary ratings of each affect item. Three variables were derived from momentary affect 
ratings: (1) average momentary affect (used as a control), and emotionally salient experiences 
operationally defined as (2) peak momentary affect and (3) recent momentary affect. Average 
Momentary Affect. For each of the four momentary affect scales (high arousal positive affect, 
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low arousal positive affect, high arousal negative affect, low arousal negative affect), each 
participant's average over the 10-day time-sampling period was computed. Peak Momentary 
Affect. For each momentary affect scale, the maximum (peak) value over the time-sampling 
period was obtained for each participant. This was done to capture instances of high intensity 
affect, given that individual episodes of peak affect are likely to be emotionally salient. Recent 
Momentary Affect. For each affect scale, a measure of recent affect was obtained by averaging 
the participant’s most recent scale ratings – their ratings from the last day of the time-sampling 
period. Participants typically completed the full six affect ratings on the last day, but some only 
completed five ratings. This last-day average was taken instead of using a single rating (the very 
last momentary affect report) to account for time of day influences on momentary ratings. 
 Retrospective Affect Ratings. Participants retrospectively reported their affect once at 
the exit session, which took place 0-4 days (M = 1.1 days, SD = 0.7) after the last day of the 
time-sampling phase, and again in a follow-up mail-out package, completed an average of 46.3 
days (SD = 18.3) post time-sampling. Follow-up package completion dates ranged from 26 to 
117 days post-time-sampling and were treated as one follow-up cluster of reports covering a 
relatively long recall period (several weeks to months), whereas the exit report cluster covered a 
much shorter period (several days). The same 8 affect items used in the time-sampling measures 
were re-administered; for each, participants indicated the extent to which they had felt that way 
since the beginning of the study (1 = “not at all” to 5 = “very much”). Hence, retrospective 
reports effectively included both the time-sampling period and the intervening time between the 
time-sampling phase and the retrospective reporting time. Items were again combined into four 
scales: high arousal positive affect (happy, excited; item intercorrelation r = 0.42, p < .01), low 
arousal positive affect (quiet, calm; r = 0.31, p < .01), high arousal negative affect (nervous, 
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irritated; r = 0.34, p < .01), and low arousal negative affect (sad, sleepy; r = .15, p = .08). Scale 
means were: high arousal positive affect (exit report M = 3.34, SD = 0.77; follow-up report M = 
3.38, SD = 0.74), low arousal positive affect (exit M = 3.47, SD = 0.79; follow-up M = 3.35, SD 
= 0.68), high arousal negative affect (exit M = 1.73, SD = 0.71; follow-up M = 1.85, SD = 0.70), 
low arousal negative affect (exit M = 1.86, SD = 0.63; follow-up M = 1.97, SD = 0.68). 
Retrospective Affect Report Discrepancies. For each retrospective report of high 
arousal positive affect, low arousal positive affect, high arousal negative affect, and low arousal 
affect (calculated from participants’ retrospective ratings at exit and follow-up), retrospective 
report discrepancies were computed as the participant’s retrospective report minus their 
corresponding average momentary affect report. Positive retrospective discrepancies indicate that 
a participant retrospectively exaggerated how they felt relative to their momentary reports, 
whereas negative retrospective discrepancies point to underestimation of felt affect. A value of 0 
for retrospective report discrepancy indicates that retrospective ratings match momentary affect 
reports exactly. Mean retrospective discrepancies were: high arousal positive affect discrepancy 
(exit report M = 0.26, SD = 0.60; follow-up report M = 0.34, SD = 0.62), low arousal positive 
affect discrepancy (exit M = -0.16, SD = 0.59; follow-up M = -0.30, SD = 0.59), high arousal 
negative affect discrepancy (exit M = 0.12, SD = 0.57; follow-up M = 0.25, SD = 0.69), low 
arousal negative affect discrepancy (exit M = 0.01, SD = 0.54; follow-up M = 0.15, SD = 0.60).  
 Personality Traits. Neuroticism (N) and Extraversion (E) were measured in the first 
mail-out package using 16 items (8 items per trait) from a 44-item version of the Big Five 
Inventory (John et al., 1991). Participants rated items on a 5-point scale (1 = “disagree strongly” 
to 5 = “agree strongly”), and scale means were: N (M = 2.25, SD = 0.74), E (M = 3.17, SD = 
0.77). Cronbach’s alphas were 0.84 for the N scale and 0.85 for E. 
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 Covariates. Models also included age, gender, ethnicity (Caucasian vs. non-Caucasian), 
education level, and Advanced Vocabulary (verbal knowledge) and Letter Sets (inductive 
reasoning) test scores, with higher scores indicating better performance (Ekstrom et al., 1976). 
Statistical Analysis 
 Multilevel modeling was used given the hierarchical data structure (retrospective reports 
nested within participants). Analyses were conducted using the lme4 package in R (Bates et al. 
2015). Retrospective report time (coded 0 = exit, 1 = follow-up) was added as a Level 1 
predictor. Level 2 (person level) predictors examined emotional salience (peak and recent affect) 
and personality (N and E) associations. Four cross-level interaction terms were added to model 
differences between exit and follow-up for recent affect, peak affect, N, and E. Models included 
age, gender, ethnicity, education, advanced vocabulary and letter sets scores, and average 
momentary affect as Level 2 covariates. 322 measurement points (179 exit reports + 143 follow-
up reports) were included in analyses at Level 1 and 179 participants were included at Level 2. 
Results 
Overview of Analyses and Descriptive Statistics 
Multilevel models predicted retrospective affect report discrepancies (differences 
between retrospective affect reports given one day or 1-2 months after the time-sampling period 
and average momentary affect reported during the time-sampling period), and how these differ 
from one retrospective report time to the next, based on specified emotional salience and 
personality predictors. Separate models were examined for high arousal positive affect, low 
arousal positive affect, high arousal negative affect, and low arousal negative affect. Table 1 
presents descriptive statistics and zero-order intercorrelations for the key study variables. In line 
with established links between neuroticism and negative affectivity, higher neuroticism was 
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associated with significantly lower average momentary high arousal positive affect, and with 
higher average momentary high arousal and low arousal negative affect. These associations 
underscore the need to account for the role of average momentary affect in this study. 
Unspecified (empty) models predicting retrospective affect report discrepancies revealed 
that at the exit session, participants retrospectively overreported their high arousal positive affect 
(report discrepancy b = 0.26, SE = 0.05, 95% CI [0.17, 0.35]) and high arousal negative affect (b 
= 0.12, SE = 0.05, 95% CI [0.03, 0.22]). Participants underreported their low arousal positive 
affect (b = -0.16, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.25, -0.07]) and accurately reported their low arousal 
negative affect (b = 0.01, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.07, 0.09]) at exit. 
Peak and Recent Affect Associations with Retrospective Affect Discrepancies 
To investigate emotional salience associations with retrospective affect report 
discrepancies, models examined peak and recent affect and their interactions with retrospective 
report time (exit vs. follow-up). Results are presented in Table 2. In line with Hypothesis 1, 
higher peak affect was associated with greater overreporting of high arousal positive affect (b = 
0.24) and high arousal negative affect (b = 0.18) at exit, and there were no associations with low 
arousal positive affect or low arousal negative affect. However, hypothesized interactions 
between peak affect and retrospective report time were not supported. Hence, participants’ 
retrospective reports of high (but not low) arousal affect were exaggerated in the direction of 
peak momentary experiences of high arousal positive and negative affect, and this exaggeration 
was no different after 1-2 months. Hypothesis 2 (pertaining to recent affect) was also not 
supported, as recent affect was not associated with retrospective report discrepancies for high 
arousal positive and negative affect at exit. However, higher recent momentary affect was 
associated with greater overreporting of low arousal positive affect at exit (b = 0.37). From exit 
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to follow-up, the association between recent affect and retrospective report discrepancies 
decreased for low arousal positive affect (b = -0.36) and high arousal negative affect (b = -0.34). 
Hence, retrospective low arousal positive affect reports were exaggerated in the direction of 
recent momentary affect experiences, and this exaggeration decreased from exit to follow-up. 
Although recent high arousal negative affect experiences were not associated with retrospective 
report discrepancies at exit, higher recent high arousal negative affect became more strongly 
associated with retrospective underreporting of this affective state from exit to follow-up. 
Neuroticism and Extraversion Associations with Retrospective Affect Discrepancies 
Neuroticism (N) and extraversion (E) and their interactions with retrospective report time 
(exit vs. follow-up) were examined to test hypotheses pertaining to personality associations with 
retrospective affect report discrepancies. Hypothesis 3 (pertaining to N) was partially supported 
as N was associated with retrospective overreporting of high arousal negative affect at exit (b = 
0.02). N was also associated with retrospective underreporting of low arousal positive affect at 
exit (b = -0.02). In line with Hypothesis 4, E was associated with retrospective overreporting of 
high arousal positive affect at exit (b = 0.02), but this association diminished from exit to follow-
up (b = -0.02). Furthermore, E was found to be associated with retrospective underreporting of 
low arousal positive affect at exit (b = -0.02) and with a decrease in retrospective overreporting 
of low arousal negative affect from exit to follow-up (b = -0.02). Hence, individuals high in N 
retrospectively exaggerated their high arousal negative affect and downplayed their low arousal 
positive affect, whereas individuals high in E retrospectively exaggerated high arousal positive 
affect and underreported low arousal positive affect. Counter to expectations, these personality 
associations with retrospective report discrepancies were no greater at follow-up than at exit. 
Most participants gave two retrospective affect reports (at exit and at follow-up), but 36 
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participants gave only one report (at exit), and hence their data were excluded from retrospective 
report time slope computations in the multilevel models. As a result, the models’ power was 
limited for detecting hypothesized interactions between personality predictors and retrospective 
report time. Because a key focus of this study is whether N and E associations with retrospective 
affect discrepancies might differ from exit to follow-up, these associations were broken down 
into simple slopes that were then tested individually, enabling their investigation with less power 
constraints. Rather than treating N and E in isolation from one another, this approach also reveals 
how retrospective affect is tied to various combinations of these personality traits. Associations 
between retrospective affect discrepancies and report time were analyzed for four different 
personality profiles: (1) high N/high E, (2) high N/low E, (3) low N/high E, and (4) low N/low E. 
The high N/high E profile, for example, was defined as having an N score of one SD above the 
sample mean for N and an E score of one SD below the sample mean for E. To supplement the 
broader personality associations reported (Table 2), results for these four distinct personality 
profiles are presented in Figure 1. This figure shows retrospective report discrepancies at exit 
and follow-up (model intercepts), and differences from exit to follow-up (model slopes).   
Overall, there are distinct personality-specific patterns in retrospective affect report 
discrepancies; the paragraph that follows provides statistical details of these patterns. Individuals 
high in both neuroticism (N) and extraversion (E) retrospectively overreported high arousal 
positive and negative affect and underreported low arousal positive affect at exit, and these 
discrepancies persisted at follow-up for high arousal negative affect and low arousal positive 
affect only. In contrast, those high in N but low in E retrospectively overreported high arousal 
negative affect at exit, and by follow-up, they were overreporting both high and low arousal 
negative affect; increases in retrospective overreporting from exit to follow-up were significant 
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for both high and low arousal negative affect. Individuals low in N but high in E retrospectively 
exaggerated high arousal positive affect at both exit and follow-up and underreported low 
arousal positive affect at follow-up. Finally, individuals low in both N and E accurately reported 
their past affect at exit but retrospectively exaggerated high arousal positive affect and low 
arousal negative affect at follow-up, exhibiting significant increases in retrospective report 
discrepancies from exit to follow-up for both kinds of affect. 
Figure 1a shows that individuals high in E, regardless of N score, retrospectively 
exaggerated high arousal positive affect at exit (high N: 0.25, SE = 0.10, 95% CI [0.05, 0.46]; 
low N: 0.23, SE = 0.10, 95% CI [0.04, 0.42]) and individuals low in N, regardless of E score, 
overreported high arousal positive affect at follow-up (high E: 0.25, SE = 0.11, 95% CI [0.04, 
0.46]; low E: 0.21, SE = 0.11, 95% CI [0.00, 0.42]). For individuals scoring low in both N and E, 
retrospective overreporting of high arousal positive affect increased from exit to follow-up (b = 
0.28, SE = 0.10, 95% CI [0.08, 0.48], d = 0.60). Turning to Figure 1b, individuals high in both E 
and N retrospectively underreported low arousal positive affect at exit (-0.27, SE = 0.11, 95% CI 
[-0.48, -0.06]), and those high in E, regardless of N score, retrospectively underreported low 
arousal positive affect at follow-up (high N: -0.46, SE = 0.11, 95% CI [-0.68, -0.24]; low N: -
0.23, SE = 0.10, 95% CI [-0.44, -0.02]). No retrospective report time differences emerged for 
low arousal positive affect for any of the personality combinations. Figure 1c reveals individuals 
high in N, regardless of E score, overreported high arousal negative affect at both exit (high E: 
0.27, SE = 0.11, 95% CI [0.06, 0.48]; low E: 0.28, SE = 0.09, 95% CI [0.09, 0.46]) and follow-up 
(high E: 0.43, SE = 0.12, 95% CI [0.20, 0.67]; low E: 0.57, SE = 0.10, 95% CI [0.37, 0.73]). This 
retrospective overreporting increased from exit to follow-up for individuals high in N and low in 
E (b = 0.29, SE = 0.09, 95% CI [0.12, 0.46], d = 0.59). Finally, as seen in Figure 1d, individuals 
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low in E, regardless of N score, overreported low arousal negative affect at follow-up only (high 
N: 0.43, SE = 0.09, 95% CI [0.24, 0.61]; low N: 0.22, SE = 0.11, 95% CI [0.01, 0.42]) and this 
retrospective overreporting increased from exit to follow-up (high N: b = 0.26, SE = 0.08, 95% 
CI [0.10, 0.42], d = 0.60; low N: b = 0.22, SE = 0.10, 95% CI [0.03, 0.41], d = 0.50). Reported 
slope effect sizes are approximations of Cohen’s d for multilevel models. 
Additional Relationships and Model Fit 
Average momentary affect, age, gender, ethnicity, education, advanced vocabulary score, 
and letter sets score were included as covariates in study models (Table 2). For each of the four 
affect categories, individuals whose average momentary affect was higher had a greater tendency 
to underreport this type of affect at exit. Older age was associated with less overreporting of high 
arousal negative affect (b = -0.01) and low arousal negative affect (b = -0.01), higher advanced 
vocabulary score with less overreporting of high arousal positive affect (b = -0.03), and higher 
letter sets score with less overreporting of low arousal negative affect (b = -0.04) at exit. 
Caucasian individuals overreported high arousal positive affect more than non-Caucasian 
individuals (b = 0.23) at exit. Finally, some overall retrospective affect report discrepancies 
remained that were unaccounted for by study models. Participants tended to overreport their high 
arousal negative affect at exit (b = 0.17). From exit to follow-up, there was a general shift toward 
greater underreporting of low arousal positive affect (b = -0.13) and greater overreporting of high 
arousal negative affect (b = 0.12) and low arousal negative affect (b = 0.14). 
 Model intraclass correlations range from 0.27 to 0.43, indicating a substantial proportion 
of variance is at the person level. Model fit was assessed by examining reductions in deviance 
for each of the four models compared to unspecified (empty) models. Significant reductions in 
deviance were obtained with all models. Model fit indicator details are presented in Table 2. 
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Discussion 
 This study examined how emotional salience and personality are tied to discrepancies 
between retrospective and concurrent affect reports, and how these associations differ depending 
on retrospective report timing. Participants provided momentary affect reports over a 10-day 
time-sampling period, and then retrospective affect reports about 1 day after the time-sampling 
period (exit session) and again after 1-2 months (follow-up mail-in package). Multilevel models 
examined emotional salience (peak and recent affect) and personality (neuroticism, extraversion) 
associations with retrospective report discrepancies for high arousal positive affect, high arousal 
negative affect, low arousal positive affect, and low arousal negative affect. 
Overall (in unspecified models that did not account for emotional salience and 
personality associations), individuals overreported their high arousal positive and negative affect 
and underreported their low arousal positive affect in retrospective as compared to average 
momentary reports. In line with Hypothesis 1, higher peak momentary high arousal positive and 
negative affect were associated with greater retrospective overreporting of these affective states 
at exit, but the expected diminishment of these ties from exit to follow-up was not found. 
Hypothesized associations between recent affect and retrospective discrepancies in high arousal 
positive and negative affect reports (Hypothesis 2) were not found. However, recent low arousal 
positive affect was associated with overreporting this affective state at exit, and this association 
decreased from exit to follow-up. The association between recent high arousal negative affect 
and retrospective overreporting of this affective state also diminished from exit to follow-up. In 
line with Hypothesis 3, neuroticism (N) was tied to retrospective exaggeration of high arousal 
negative affect at exit, but this association was not significantly stronger at follow-up. N was also 
associated with retrospective underreporting of low arousal positive affect at exit. Finally, the 
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predicted link between extraversion (E) and retrospective exaggeration of high arousal positive 
affect (Hypothesis 4) was found at exit, but this association was diminished at follow-up. E was 
also associated with retrospective underreporting of low arousal positive affect at exit, and with a 
decrease in retrospective overreporting of low arousal negative affect from exit to follow-up. To 
better understand these broad personality associations, they were broken down into retrospective 
affect discrepancies at exit and follow-up for individuals with (1) high N and high E, (2) high N 
and low E, (3) low N and high E, and (4) low N and low E. Emotional salience associations with 
retrospective report discrepancies are discussed first, followed by personality associations. 
Peak and Recent Affect Associations with Retrospective Affect Discrepancies 
 Higher peak affect was associated with greater retrospective overreporting of high 
arousal affect, both positive and negative, but not of low arousal affect. This study thus extends 
previous research on peak affect influences, which had not distinguished between high and low 
arousal affect (Fredrickson, 2000; Hedges et al., 1985; Kahneman, 2000; Parkinson et al., 1995). 
For high and low arousal positive affect, most participants’ peaks fell at the upper end of the 5-
point scale, which is typical of healthy adults. Still, findings should be replicated in a sample 
whose peak affect covers the full scale range. Peak affect associations did not diminish from exit 
to follow-up as predicted; however, this may be because each participant reported multiple peaks 
for each type of affect over the time-sampling period. If peak affect is continually reinforced 
through repeated experiences, its ties with retrospective reports may not fade over the long term.  
 Predicted associations between recent high arousal positive and negative affect and 
retrospective exaggeration of these affective states were not supported. It may be that peak affect 
trumps recent affect associations with retrospective reports, and hence, recency associations are 
not always detectable in models that include both. This is in line with much of the literature on 
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peak and recent affect influences on retrospective report discrepancies, which has found that 
recency effects are relatively weak and, in some cases, undetectable (Fredrickson, 2000; Hedges 
et al., 1985). It is also possible that operationalizing recent affect as the last-day average instead 
of as the single last affect rating took away from the salience of recent affective experiences 
captured in this study. Interestingly, however, recent low arousal positive affect was associated 
with exaggerated retrospective reports, an association that diminished from exit to follow-up. It 
seems recent low arousal positive affect may be particularly memorable, at least for a few days. 
 Emotionally salient experiences (e.g. peak high arousal negative affect due to layoff 
threats) are reinforced in memory for good reason, and this study’s findings underscore the need 
to account for their potential role in affect recall. People’s judgments of how they felt over a 
given period need to be interpreted carefully, in research and in life. 
Neuroticism and Extraversion Associations with Retrospective Affect Discrepancies  
 This study affirms previous research linking neuroticism (N) with negative affect 
exaggeration and extraversion (E) with positive affect exaggeration in retrospective reports 
(Barrett, 1997; Mill et al., 2016; Safer & Keuler, 2002), and further reveals these associations are 
specific to high arousal negative/positive affect, rather than low arousal affect. Findings show 
links between personality-related self-knowledge and affect recall, and reasonably so given that 
propensity for high arousal negative affect (e.g. anxiety, worry) is central to N, whereas E is 
strongly linked with high arousal positive affect (e.g. happiness, high energy; Costa & McCrae, 
1989; Watson & Clark, 1992). Exploratory analyses revealed these personality links tended to be 
stronger when individuals were retrospecting over a longer period (several weeks vs. several 
days), suggesting that individuals were making greater use of personality-related self-knowledge 
to compensate for fading memory of emotional experiences (Robinson & Clore, 2002). 
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 Specifically, in line with predictions, individuals high in N retrospectively exaggerated 
high arousal negative affect at both report times, though initial analyses did not show differences 
from exit to follow-up. Interestingly, in follow-up analyses looking at different combinations of 
N and E, individuals who were both high in N and low in E showed a stronger pattern of 
retrospectively overreporting negative affect. In addition to high arousal negative affect, these 
individuals also exaggerated their low arousal negative affect at follow-up, and their 
exaggeration of both types of negative affect increased from exit to follow-up. It may be that 
individuals who are low E see themselves as even more prone to negative affectivity, perhaps 
because being low E also means having less energy and enthusiasm (Watson & Clark, 1992). 
Indeed, these exploratory analyses found low E was associated with greater retrospective 
overreporting of low arousal negative affect at follow-up, even for individuals high in N. 
Findings linking low E with retrospective exaggeration of both high and low arousal negative 
affect dovetail with previous research revealing a negative association between E and 
retrospective exaggeration of fear and sadness over a two-week period (Mill et al., 2016). 
Hypotheses pertaining to E were partially supported in that individuals high in E 
overreported their high arousal positive affect at exit. Although it appeared in initial analyses that 
this association was diminished at follow-up, subsequent exploratory analyses revealed an 
association at follow-up, but only for individuals who were also low in N. It seems that low N is 
a key trait linked with exaggerating high arousal positive affect over the longer term; indeed, 
individuals low in N retrospectively overreported their high arousal positive affect at follow-up, 
regardless of their level of E. It may be that being low in N, and hence less prone to negative 
affect in general (Watson & Clark, 1992), means these individuals see their affective tendencies 
in a more positive light retrospectively and as part of general self-schemas. This interpretation is 
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also in line with previous research showing a negative association between N and retrospective 
exaggeration of happiness (Mill et al., 2016). Individuals who were high in E also tended to 
retrospectively underreport low arousal positive affect, an association that increased overall from 
exit to follow-up. Exploratory analyses also showed this association at follow-up regardless of 
individuals’ level of N. High E individuals tend to be talkative and energetic (Costa & McCrae, 
1989), hence, it may be that their memory for times when they were calm and quiet is not very 
pronounced, especially when drawing on self-knowledge to recall affect over a longer period.  
This study links different personality profiles with distinct retrospective affect report 
discrepancy patterns, showing how the interplay of N and E is tied to affect recall. Findings 
extend the literature linking personality with retrospective-concurrent affect report discrepancies 
(Barrett, 1997; Mill et al., 2016; Safer & Keuler, 2002) by going beyond valence-based models 
of affect to show how report discrepancies are also tied to the arousal dimension of affect 
(Russell, 1980). This study’s use of two retrospective report times in multilevel models also 
extends previous work that looked only at one-time retrospective affect ratings or relatively short 
recall periods (Barrett, 1997; Mill et al., 2016; Robinson & Clore, 2002; Safer & Keuler, 2002). 
Reflecting on past affective experiences is important for knowing oneself and making 
sense of one’s life (Thomas & Diener, 1990). Not only is personality-related self-knowledge 
used to fill affective memory gaps, but individuals may also pull information from their affective 
experiences to understand their own personalities. Thus, habitual biases in how people remember 
affective experiences might serve to create and reinforce self-schemas, which, in turn, shape 
responses on personality self-reports (Safer & Keuler, 2002). Affective experiences and self-
knowledge seem to mutually reinforce one another. Hence, although the current findings are 
interpreted as personality influences on retrospective affect reports, they could also be 
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interpreted as capturing a snapshot of a cyclical process, rather than a unidirectional relationship.  
Another explanation for these findings invokes personality differences in emotional 
processing. People high in N are more likely to retrieve negative memories, whereas those high 
in E have a bias toward positive memory retrieval, and these personality influences interact with 
current affect to create memory discrepancies (Rusting, 1998). A potential mechanism involves 
behavioural approach/inhibition: people high in E may be more attentive to positive affect, which 
motivates approach behaviour, while those high in N may be more attentive to negative affect, 
which motivates avoidance (Gray, 1981). Future work should include measures of behavioural 
approach/inhibition and current affect (during retrospection) to investigate these possibilities. 
 Some have argued that affect is not directly stored in memory - that we access beliefs 
about affect rather than affect itself (Wyer, Clore, & Isbell, 1999), calling into question whether 
it is in fact possible to give accurate retrospective reports of felt affect. This study’s findings 
suggest certain people may exaggerate or downplay certain types of affect when reporting how 
they felt over a given period. Hence, in research and in daily life, we need to be mindful of 
personality and other potential sources of retrospective affect report discrepancies when asking 
people to tell us how they have felt. Personality-congruent discrepancies between retrospective 
and concurrent affect reports are not necessarily a bad thing. Retrospective reports shaped by 
personality are useful in that they can reveal a lot about a person’s belief structures; arguably, 
they reveal more about a person than concurrent affect reports (Robinson & Clore, 2002). 
Age and Other Covariates’ Associations with Retrospective Affect Report Discrepancies 
 Gender, ethnicity, education, two cognitive performance measures, and age were 
included as control variables in study models. Although gender may be a source of affect-related 
self-schemas shaping affect recall (Robinson et al., 1998), no gender differences in retrospective 
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affect report discrepancies were found. Individuals identifying as Caucasian overreported their 
high arousal positive affect more than non-Caucasian individuals; this may reflect cultural 
differences in affect valuation (Tsai et al., 2006). Higher scores on the advanced vocabulary and 
letter sets tests were associated with less retrospective overreporting of high arousal positive 
affect and low arousal negative affect, respectively. Hence, verbal knowledge and inductive 
reasoning do seem to enable greater accuracy in retrospectively reporting certain kinds of affect. 
 A key strength of this study is its use of a lifespan community sample (age 20-78 years), 
enabling comparisons across age-heterogenous groups. Greater age was associated with less 
retrospective overreporting of high and low arousal negative affect, and no associations were 
found for positive affect. These findings align with previous research on memory for emotionally 
valenced stimuli, which demonstrated a reduced negativity bias in old age (Grühn et al., 2007). 
Findings also concord with conceptual models positing that older adults aim to reduce their 
negative affect (Mather & Carstensen, 2005). Previous findings linking older age with less 
retrospective underreporting of felt positive affect (Ready et al., 2007) were not replicated. This 
may be attributable to the present study’s distinction between high arousal positive affect, which 
is retrospectively overreported across the lifespan, and low arousal positive affect, which tends to 
be underreported - underscoring the need to consider the affect arousal dimension in this 
research. Still, older adults give quite accurate retrospective affect reports compared to their 
younger counterparts (Röcke, Hoppmann, & Klumb, 2011), a testament to how well-maintained 
emotional memory systems are in late life. Overall, despite the report discrepancies described 
here, people’s retrospective reports of felt affect are quite accurate (Kardum & Daskijević, 2001). 
Limitations and Future Directions 
  This study examined emotional salience and personality links with retrospective-
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momentary affect report discrepancies at different retrospective report times. After a 10-day 
momentary affect assessment period, participants retrospectively reported felt intensity of 
different affective states since the beginning of the study – once at an exit session about one day 
after the end of the momentary assessment period, and again through a mail-in follow-up 
package completed 1-2 months later. Because momentary affect reports were only collected over 
a 10-day period, whereas participants were asked to recall their affect since the beginning of the 
study (regardless of how long it had been since the momentary assessment period), retrospective 
reports provided at follow-up cover both more time and a greater portion of experience that was 
not captured in momentary reports. Hence, differences between exit and follow-up retrospective 
report discrepancies may also be ascribed to a) differences in time delay between the momentary 
assessment period and the retrospective report, b) differences in the length of the period over 
which participants were asked to retrospect, or c) differences in the proportion of this reporting 
period that was captured by momentary affect reports. Participants did indicate that the 
momentary assessment period was typical of their everyday lives (4.2 on a 5-point scale). Hence, 
the momentary reports captured during this period can be assumed to be representative of their 
typical affective experiences. Still, follow-up research investigating retrospective affect report 
discrepancies should aim to disentangle elapsed time from retrospective reporting period length 
and examine the potential influence of affective experiences not captured by momentary reports. 
 Participants’ average high and low arousal negative affect scores were highly correlated 
(r = 0.71). This may have resulted from participants’ relatively low endorsement of negative 
affective items, in line with the extant literature on community-dwelling samples (Magai et al., 
2006; Tsai et al., 2006). Still, it is useful to conceptually distinguish between high and low 
arousal negative affect, and future research should take care to select negative affect items with 
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adequate distributional properties in diverse samples. Finally, 20 percent of the sample was lost 
to attrition between exit and follow-up, with attrition biased toward participants who were 
younger and not Caucasian/White. This limits the generalizability of the reported findings. 
Conclusions 
 How do we make sense of our affective experiences? Salient memories of intense or 
recent experiences serve as guides – helping us decide which to pursue and which to avoid in the 
future. This study suggests that peak intensity experiences of high arousal positive and negative 
affect magnify retrospective affect reports, and that recent low arousal positive affect magnifies 
retrospective affect. Personality (neuroticism and extraversion) may also play a key role in filling 
memory gaps by helping us reconstruct our affective experiences based on broader conceptions 
of who we are. This study links specific personality profiles with distinct retrospective affect 
report discrepancy patterns: high N/high E with exaggerating high arousal positive and negative 
affect and underreporting low arousal positive affect, high N/low E with exaggerating high and 
low arousal negative affect and even more so over the longer term, and low N/high E with 
exaggerating high arousal positive affect and underreporting low arousal positive affect. To 
extend these findings, research should incorporate other potential sources of report discrepancies, 
such as approach/avoidance motivation and mood during retrospection (Levine et al., 2009; 
Parkinson et al., 1995). Discrepancies between retrospective and momentary affect reports are 
not necessarily a problem – retrospective affect better reflects self-knowledge and better predicts 
future choices than affect reported in the moment (Schwarz, 2007; Wirtz et al., 2003). Overall, 
there are good reasons for exaggerating or downplaying certain affective experiences in memory 
and for studying these processes. Paying attention to emotionally meaningful experiences that 
align with one’s identity is crucial to navigating a complex emotional world.  
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Tables 
Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations of Central Predictor Variables and Variable Intercorrelations (N = 179 participants) 
   Mean (SD)    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10    11    12 
1. Gender  51% female   0.00 -0.08 -0.08 -0.05  0.12  0.07  0.18* -0.12 -0.11  0.08  0.12  
2. Age  48.75 (18.96)    0.13 -0.12  0.14 -0.49** -0.20  0.01  0.06  0.29* -0.24 -0.42**  
3.  Ethnicity  74% Caucasian     0.14  0.28*  0.12 -0.05  0.08 -0.01 -0.03          0.00         -0.05  
4. Education  7.22 (1.90)      0.27**  0.22**  0.05  0.03 -0.12         -0.05          0.07          0.01      
5. Advanced vocabulary  10.81 (3.24)       0.26 -0.10 -0.15 -0.10  0.10 -0.05 -0.02  
6. Letter sets  10.31 (2.80)        0.08 -0.06  0.05 -0.07  0.06  0.16  
7. Neuroticism  2.25 (0.74)        -0.20 -0.34** -0.26  0.42**  0.35**  
8. Extraversion  3.17 (0.77)          0.22 -0.15  0.00 -0.07  
9. Average HAPA  3.07 (0.60)           0.14 -0.15 -0.27* 
10. Average LAPA  3.64 (0.52)           -0.39** -0.31* 
11. Average HANA  1.61 (0.52)             0.71** 
12. Average LANA  1.85 (0.48)             
Note. HAPA = high arousal positive affect; LAPA = low arousal positive affect; HANA = high arousal negative affect; LANA = low arousal negative affect. 
Gender coded as 1 = female, 0 = male; ethnicity coded as 0 = non-Caucasian, 1 = Caucasian; education ranges from 1 (less than 12 years) to 11 
(J.D./M.D.Ph.D.). Advanced Vocabulary and Letter Sets scores are out of 18 and 15, respectively; and all other variables are scored on 5-point Likert scales.   
* p < .05, ** p < .01  
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Table 2 
Hierarchical Linear Models Predicting Retrospective-Momentary Affect Report Discrepancies from Report Time, Emotional Salience, 
and Personality Using Full Maximum Likelihood Estimation (N = 322; 179 retrospective reports at exit + 143 reports at follow-up) 
 High arousal positive  
affect report discrepancy 
Low arousal positive 
affect report discrepancy 
High arousal negative 
affect report discrepancy 
Low arousal negative 
affect report discrepancy 
Fixed effects: b (SE) [95% CI]     
    Intercept  0.09 (0.08)  -0.07 (0.08)   0.17 (0.08) *      [0.01,0.33]  0.05 (0.07)  
    Retrospective report time  0.07 (0.05) -0.13 (0.06) *     [-0.25,-0.01]  0.12 (0.05) *      [0.02,0.22]  0.14 (0.05) **   [0.04,0.24] 
    Average momentary affect -0.43 (0.12) *** [-0.67,-0.19] -0.42 (0.13) **   [-0.68,-0.16] -0.64 (0.15) ***  [-0.94,-0.34] -0.46 (0.14) **   [-0.74,-0.18] 
    Peak momentary affect  0.24 (0.10) *     [0.04,0.44]  0.00 (0.15)   0.18 (0.06) **    [0.06,0.30] -0.09 (0.07) 
    Recent momentary affect  0.06 (0.09)          0.37 (0.11) *** [0.15,0.59]  0.16 (0.12)    0.06 (0.10) 
    Age (years) -0.00 (0.00)  -0.00 (0.00)  -0.01 (0.00) **   [-0.01,-0.01] -0.01 (0.00) *** [-0.01,-0.01] 
    Ethnicity  0.23 (0.09) **   [0.05,0.41] -0.12 (0.08)  -0.06 (0.09) -0.05 (0.08)  
    Advanced vocabulary score -0.03 (0.01) *     [-0.05,-0.01]  0.00 (0.01)   0.02 (0.01)    0.01 (0.01)  
    Letter sets score  0.02 (0.02)   0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) *     [-0.07,-0.00] 
    Neuroticism  0.00 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) *     [-0.03,-0.00]      0.02 (0.01) *     [0.00,0.03]      0.01 (0.01)  
    Extraversion  0.02 (0.01) *** [0.01,0.04] -0.02 (0.01) *     [-0.03,-0.00] -0.00 (0.01)   -0.01 (0.01) 
    Peak affect x report time  0.15 (0.13)  0.12 (0.19) -0.06 (0.07)  0.06 (0.09) 
    Recent affect x report time -0.09 (0.09)  -0.36 (0.10) *** [-0.56,-0.17] -0.34 (0.10) *** [-0.53,-0.14] -0.06 (0.09) 
    Neuroticism x report time -0.01 (0.01)  -0.00 (0.01)   0.02 (0.01)    0.00 (0.01)  
    Extraversion x report time -0.02 (0.01) *    [-0.04,-0.00] -0.01 (0.01)  -0.01 (0.01)   -0.02 (0.01)  *    [-0.03,-0.00] 
Random effects     
    Intercept variance  0.14  0.14  0.15  0.13 
    Report time slope variance  0.11  0.13  0.10  0.09 
Model fit indices     
    Intraclass correlation (ICC)  0.43 0.27 0.40 0.41 
    Deviance reduction  63.68 *** 49.31 *** 80.38 *** 55.29 *** 
Note. Retrospective report time coded 0 = exit report, 1 = follow-up report; ethnicity coded 0 = non-Caucasian, 1 = Caucasian; advanced vocabulary scored out 
of 18; letter sets scored out of 15; all other variables scored on 5-point scales. Deviance reduction compares full model and unspecified model deviance. Gender 
and timing of peak affect episodes were also examined as covariates; neither significantly predicted any outcomes, hence, more parsimonious models without 
these terms are presented. Additional models included Agreeableness, which was also associated with retrospective overreporting of high arousal positive affect 
at exit and underreporting of high and low arousal negative affect at follow-up. Agreeableness associations, however, are beyond the scope of this manuscript, 
and their inclusion in models does not substantively change reported findings. Retrospective report discrepancy associations with Conscientiousness and 
Openness to experience were also tested but were not significant. Regression coefficients are unstandardized. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Figures 
Figure 1. Discrepancies in retrospective reports of high arousal positive affect (a), low arousal 
positive affect (b), high arousal negative affect (c), and low arousal negative affect (d) as a 
function of retrospective report time for different combinations of neuroticism and extraversion. 
 
 
